



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

TRANSACTIONS  
OF THE  
AMERICAN PHILOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION.  
1890.

---

I. — *The Order of Words in Greek.*

By THOMAS DWIGHT GOODELL,  
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN YALE UNIVERSITY.

WHOEVER would appreciate fully a piece of literature in any language must be able to appreciate the artistic form. The story may be interesting, the drama impressive; the speech may move, and the portrayal of human life in action and passion may be recognized as profoundly true; but if Homer remains merely an artless prose, and Sophokles a rather crabbed prose, and Demosthenes the kind of prose found in those translations which some students depend upon, then the artistic form is wholly missed. It is no wonder that people who have missed this think the classical literature overestimated, and doubt the value of classical studies, holding that translations are as good as the originals. It is the importance of form that renders imperative the nearest practicable approach to the ancient pronunciation and to the ancient rendering of verse. Now the order of words, in both prose and poetry, not only is a large factor in literary form in the higher sense, but is obviously one of the means for the simple expression of thought, apart from any purpose that can be called artistic. In plain unimagina-  
tive prose, one order may give a very different meaning from

another. It is clear that one who cares really to understand an author, whether in Greek, Latin, or a modern tongue, needs a lively sense of the shades of thought and feeling which the order conveyed to the native.

But in the endeavor to acquire this with regard to Greek the student gets little help from books or from teachers. The ordinary grammars and other text-books barely touch the subject. Occasionally an editor calls attention to the order in a passage; but when this is done at all it not infrequently happens that the order is interpreted wrongly. The latest instance of this that has come to my attention is in Verrall's edition of the *Agamemnon*, as noted by Campbell in his review of that book.<sup>1</sup> Verrall's interpretation of line 15 is based on the assumption that ὑπὸν at the end of the line has the place of emphasis, on which Campbell truly remarks, "The place of emphasis in a senarius is not the last foot, but the first." Even Rehdantz-Blass in their edition of the *Philippics*, an edition in general most admirable, err now and then in this respect, as will be shown later. If we go to the ancient critics and read the treatise of Dionysios of Halikarnassos *περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων*, we recognize indeed a keen observer and analyzer, whose subject includes that of order, and whose clear exposition is instructive in many directions. But his point of view is different from ours. He was a Greek writing for Greeks, or at least for those who were already familiar with the language as a living speech. We are barbarians, obliged to learn the language from books. What he assumes to be already in his reader's possession, perfect familiarity with all ordinary ways of arranging words, an immediate instinctive feeling for the different effects produced by different orders, — just this it is which the modern student lacks and wishes to acquire. Besides, with all his keenness in the analysis of details, Dionysios apparently failed to see certain matters of more importance. The greater part of his treatise deals with euphony; but euphony has less to do with determining the order, at least in prose,

<sup>1</sup> *Classical Review*, July, 1890, p. 301.

than forces of another sort. Among modern scholars who have treated the subject connectedly, Kühner in his *Ausführliche Grammatik* devotes to it several sections, which contain some good observations; but the main principles there laid down prove of no practical value, even if one can admit that they are sound. Professor Short's *Essay on the Order of Words in Attic Greek Prose*, prefixed to the American edition of Yonge's *English-Greek lexicon*, is a learned collection of examples, but so arranged as to be of little use, even as a collection of material, and bringing to light no such general principles and practical precepts as the learner wants. In Henri Weil's *Order of Words in the Ancient Languages Compared with the Modern*, well known in this country through the recent translation by President Charles W. Super, we find something far better. As might be expected from a scholar of such wide knowledge and sound judgment, this little book may truly be called, in the words of the translator's preface, "a lucid and systematic introduction to the study of the whole question. Even if we dissent from his conclusions in part or in whole, we cannot read his book without being stimulated to further research." I gladly acknowledge my indebtedness to the little work for stimulus and suggestion, as well as for much instruction, notwithstanding the fact that the author's presentation of the matter appears to me in some parts inadequate and in some erroneous.<sup>1</sup>

The fundamental thesis of Weil is substantially as follows.<sup>2</sup> The order of words reproduces the order of thought, is regulated by the order of ideas; in Latin and Greek this order of ideas may be, and usually is, independent of the syntactical order, while in French and English, owing to lack of inflections, the order of syntax and of thought are usually in close agreement; but in ancient and modern languages alike the order of words and the order of thought are identical; hence, in translating from one language to another, since the order

<sup>1</sup> The chapter on Latin order in the last edition of Allen and Greenough's *Latin Grammar* also furnished some suggestions, although part of the statements there made certainly do not apply to Greek.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 26 ff., also 36 f. of translation.

of thought is the important thing, while the syntactical dress is of minor value, one should preserve so far as possible the order of the original, changing the syntax for that purpose as much as may be necessary. He then proceeds to inquire what notions naturally begin the sentence, what notions naturally close it, in ancient and modern languages alike; what, in a word, is the natural order of thought, and why. In this manner he arrives at his explanation of the order of words.

Now if we look first at his practical precept with regard to translation, and try to apply it, not to a selected sentence here and there, but to continuous pages, we are struck with the fact that often with the best of intention and endeavor we come out with a form in which, while we have preserved the original order, we have distorted the original thought. Indeed, Weil himself modifies the assertion "that men think and express themselves in the same order, whether they speak a modern language or use one of the ancient languages," by adding distinctly that the assertion is not absolute, and by quoting from Voltaire some marked exceptions.<sup>1</sup> He attributes the exceptions to the tyranny of syntax, which has led to the sacrifice of the natural march of ideas. But no one would have deemed Voltaire's order in any way unnatural, had not the Greek order, clearly not the same, been taken as the norm of nature. In other words, there are cases—they are in truth too numerous to be called exceptions—in which the natural modern order of ideas differs markedly from the natural ancient order. But now let us examine in what sense it is true that "the order of ideas is shown by the order of words"; that "this march of ideas exists in the thought itself before it has been clothed in grammatical forms." Without entering into the abstract question as to the possibility of a separation between thought and language, it is certain that in man as modified by literary culture, trying to express his thoughts in a cultivated tongue, such a separation, if it exists at all, exists in a degree too slight to affect our investigation. The ideas to be embodied

<sup>1</sup> O.c. pp. 37 ff.

in a sentence do not first arise unembodied in the mind, arranged in a definite order, and then seek to be expressed in words in that order. Idea and word commonly present themselves together. The process may often be this. A thought enters the mind instantaneously, not fully drawn out in grammatical form, not yet sufficiently embodied in words to be communicable to others, but typified to the mind by a single word or phrase, or perhaps by an imaginary visual image, as a diagram or a picture, or even by a combination of musical sounds — by something which, while it symbolizes and enables the mind to hold fast the entire thought, yet really expresses only the central notion, and that perhaps vaguely. Thought and symbol become subjects of consciousness together, and the process of elaborating and defining the thought is identical at every step with the process of embodying it fully in words. In the final communicable form the germinal idea may stand first or last or elsewhere, nor has the order of time in the successive steps of definition any influence whatever on the final order of words. In no sense, in fact, can the order of ideas in a sentence be regarded as something either temporally or logically independent of words, as possessed of a separate individuality to whose claims the order of words is accommodated. Though separable in thought, the idea and its representative word are never sufficiently separated in experience to affect the question in hand. The order of words and that of ideas are indeed identical because of the impossibility of divorcing them. The order of words simply represents the order in which the writer or speaker chose for various reasons to bring his ideas before the mind of another. Only in this sense can Weil's doctrine as to the relation between the order of words and that of ideas be accepted both as true and as offering solid ground from which to investigate further. And is it not equally true that the order of ideas is to some extent determined by the order of words? For the customs of the thinker's language are antecedent to the individual thinker, and in conveying ideas in language, no one can escape the influence of these customs. Thus we are again brought

back to the fact that the customs of languages differ greatly in respect to verbal order; that an order common in any tongue is entirely natural to the native users of that tongue, though it comes to seem natural to the foreigner of differing idiom only after long familiarity. What we are seeking is, in fact, such a statement of the Greek customs regarding verbal order, and of the principles that underlie those customs, as shall, while reducing to the minimum the differences between the Greek order and that familiar to us, assist us to acquire as nearly as possible the feeling for Greek order which the native had. The Greek order differs distinctly even from the Latin. It is a pity that Weil, who is of course perfectly conscious of these differences, made no attempt to tell us what they are or to what they are due; in fact, does not in his essay even mention their existence. This in itself tends to impair our confidence in his results. One great merit, however, Weil's essay has. It points out clearly the principle that the order of syntax must be separated in thought from the order of ideas, and was by both Greeks and Romans freely separated in practice. This is the first sure step, and is a long one, towards an understanding of Greek and Latin order. This step is due to Weil, who developed, modified, and applied to the classic languages, as he himself tells us,<sup>1</sup> a principle which had been stated for German by the grammarians Herling and K. F. Becker.<sup>2</sup>

In endeavoring to carry the investigation farther, our starting-point is the principle arrived at above: The order of words represents the order in which the speaker or writer chose, for various reasons, to bring his ideas before the mind of another. It is true that in much writing and in more speaking the order cannot be considered the result of deliber-

<sup>1</sup>O.c. p. 16.

<sup>2</sup>In the 11th edition (1876) of Becker's *Handbuch der deutschen Sprache* the doctrine in question is stated in the following terms. After defining and distinguishing the "grammatische Form des Satzes und der Satzverhältnisse" and the "logische Form des Gedankens und der Begriffe," he says: "Die logische Form des Gedankens und der Begriffe wird durch die *Betonung* und durch die *Wortfolge* bezeichnet." He then points out that often the logical form and the grammatical form are more or less independent of each other.

ate choice ; one merely adopts a current formula without real thought on the subject. But that only takes us one step farther back, for what was the origin of the formula? The varieties of order current in any language are all the result of psychological action continued through generations of speakers and writers. They are always liable to some degree of conscious modification by like action in the mind of the individual ; and in a given sentence — unless it be very simple — proceeding from one who has anything to say that is worth listening to, the element of custom and that of individual choice are both likely to be present. We have then to inquire into the character of this mental action, which must be now in ourselves of essentially the same nature as in ancient Greece, even if it should prove to be not the same in all details. The difference between the results of this action in Greek and English is due mainly, if not in the last analysis wholly, to difference of material in the two languages. Moreover, although this action is often well-nigh unconscious, yet in careful composition we can observe it in ourselves without difficulty. What, in such a case, is the situation? We wish to communicate something, as an emotion, a narrative, a command, an argument ; we wish to make the communication as effective, for the purpose in view, as the medium, or our command of the medium, will permit. Here are three elements to be considered. That which is to be communicated in each instance is known, — must be known before it can be communicated ; this is intended to produce a definite effect on another mind, whose capacity and limitations, of inner nature or outward circumstance, are also known, or must be assumed as known ; the medium is language, that portion of the resources of English, Greek, or whatever it may be, which the individual in question has at command. It is evident that the communication may vary infinitely in form with the variation of one or more of these elements. Therefore in estimating the fitness of a given order, as well as in endeavoring to ascertain the reasons for its adoption, none of the three can be left out of account. Yet as human nature is fundamentally the same, that factor — the character



and circumstances of the person or persons addressed—is perhaps more nearly constant than either of the other two. Now language has one dominating characteristic—whose far-reaching significance Lessing first made evident in his *Laokoon*—namely, that it is conditioned primarily in time. That is, its constituent parts, uttered sounds or their written signs, are not apprehended simultaneously, as are the forms and colors in space which are the constituent parts of a work in the domain of the arts of design, but succeed each other in time. Lessing discussed the differences which follow from this fact between poetry and the arts of design. On the same characteristic depends all rhythm in language, as well as a great variety of means for rhetorical effect, and on it depends the importance of the order of words, which is the order of ideas. With diction, or the choice of words for conveying ideas, we are not at present concerned, though it may be stated that a predetermined order may influence both the choice and the grammatical form of words.<sup>1</sup> But given the suitable words for expressing a complex thought, it is evident that the effect produced by these may differ much with the order of succession in which they are brought before the mind. One order may conduce to clearness of apprehension, another may mystify; one may lay special force on a single word, another may distribute the emphasis; one may present the separate ideas primarily as a series of details, another may so present the same details that they shall be felt rather as forming a whole. In the trite line, *Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus*, the fun lies partly in the fact that the great expectations raised by the first two words are not wholly dashed until the very last syllable. In reverse order the statement that ‘a mouse, funny little creature, is about to be born, for the mountains are even now in labor,’ though conveyed in a Latin hexameter as good as that of Horace, would scarcely have raised a smile. In the lines,

Pay ransom to the owner,  
And fill the bag to the brim.  
Who is the owner? The slave is owner,  
And ever was. Pay him.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dion. Hal. *περί συνθέσεως*, 6.

could Emerson have caused his main idea to strike home with equal force by any arrangement whereby it should be followed instead of preceded by the idea of the first couplet? To enumerate all possible combinations and assign reasons for each would be an endless task. One might as well try to enumerate all possible melodies. But if we can ascertain the principles underlying the varieties that are most common and most characteristic, we shall be on the right road towards the desired goal; namely, the acquisition of the feeling for order which the Greeks had. To this end it is especially desirable to find out, if we can, wherein their feeling was different from our own, as well as wherein it agreed with ours.

Inferring now from our own mental action, we may say that in Greek, as in modern languages, the considerations that affect order fall under three heads.

*First, syntactic.* — The order is a means of indicating grammatical relations, and is in part determined by the necessity of making those relations clear. ‘The boy saw the man; the man saw the boy.’ These sentences are alike in everything but order, yet they differ in meaning, since the order, and that alone, tells which is subject and which object. Naturally a slightly inflected tongue is forced to make a wider use of position for this purpose than one rich in inflections. In Chinese position must do everything for syntax; English depends on the same means to a considerable extent; German less. The more the resources of position are drawn upon for this purpose, the narrower must be the range of other uses which it can serve. Greek is well supplied with grammatical apparatus of another sort; yet even here the use of order to denote syntax was by no means unimportant. The position of the article with reference to its noun is necessarily confined within narrow limits, if ambiguity is to be avoided. So with an adjective or modifying genitive or pronoun; one may precede or follow the other according to circumstances, and a word or words may intervene, if the relation is not thereby obscured; but the limits are narrow. σοφὸς ὁ ἀνὴρ and ὁ σοφὸς ἀνὴρ we early learn to distinguish. The preposition cannot be widely separated from its object, and usually pre-

cedes. The adverb must ordinarily be near the word it modifies ; some, like adverbial *καί* and *οὐδέ*, must immediately precede the word or phrase modified, only *γάρ* and one or two other particles being allowed to separate them ; *δή* must, with a like exception, immediately follow the word emphasized, if one is to know on what its force is thrown ; *διὰ ταῦτα* *δὴ* *φήσει τίς με ἑξαμαρτάνειν* is clearly different from *διὰ ταῦτα* *φήσει δὴ τίς με ἑξαμαρτάνειν*. If it be asked what it was that established these rules, it would in some cases be difficult to give a satisfactory answer. Accident, or the effect of some long-forgotten fact in a word's earlier history, may have fixed one order rather than another as normal. Thus we have a list of post-positive words, — *ἄν, γάρ, οὖν, δέ, μέν*, and the rest. How did it come about that one said *τὸν ἐαυτοῦ παῖδα διδάσκεται* but *ἐκείνου τὸν παῖδα διδάσκεται*? The stereotyping process is sometimes traceable, sometimes not ; but if usage is well settled, it is easy to learn, and by practice such conventionalities may come to seem a matter of course. On the other hand, there is logical ground in the nature of thought for the rule that the conjunction, if coördinating, stands between the coördinated members, and if connecting a subordinate to a leading clause, begins the former. The relative, too, whether pronoun or adverb, naturally begins its clause, since it partakes of the nature of the conjunction. Without going farther into details, these and like rules may be included in our first group, named as above.

*Second, rhetorical.* — The order is influenced by the desire so to present the elements of the communication that the reader or listener shall, with the least possible effort, conceive them in the relations to each other, apart from those of syntax, and especially in the relative weight and importance intended by the author. Of course order is not the only means to this end, often not the principal means. In a language like Chinese it would seem that all the resources of order must be consumed in another function, and that position could not possibly indicate rhetorical relations. In English we are much restricted in this regard by the lack of inflection, so that we are compelled to rely largely, for rhetor-

ical effects, on the stress and intonation of the living voice ; and the choice of words and figures of speech must ordinarily play a more important part than position in such effects. Yet every one is conscious that, apart from and beyond the requirements of syntax, relation and proportion as well as lucidity depend greatly on the order. This is true of the arrangement of the larger divisions of an entire piece ; the same principle holds good in the arrangement of the members of a compound sentence, and in the arrangement of the words within each clause. The rich verbal and participial inflection in Greek favors a complexity of sentence structure which would be clumsy in English ; but the order of clauses differs little from that in English, if we except the one principle — which is, it is true, of very frequent application — that the relative clause in Greek, whether introduced by pronoun or adverb, strongly tends to precede the demonstrative, while in English the tendency is strongly the other way. Yet even here the difference often lies merely in the fact that, while Greek omits the so-called antecedent, we insert it before the relative, and thus incorporate the relative clause within the other. The tendency to the periodic structure, by which the principal verb is reserved till the very close, after all modifiers of both subject and predicate, a tendency so familiar to us in Latin, is hardly more prominent in Greek than in our own tongue. It is within the clause that differences of order are most marked as between ancient and modern languages, and it is therefore with the order of words within the clause that we are now most concerned. And here of course, from its fulness of inflections, Greek enjoys far greater freedom than English. Where we must say, ‘ The man saw the boy,’ Greek can say equally well, τὸν παῖδα εἶδεν ὁ ἀνὴρ, τὸν παῖδα ὁ ἀνὴρ εἶδεν, εἶδεν ὁ ἀνὴρ τὸν παῖδα, without changing syntax in the least, but with very different rhetorical effect. If in English the syntax is changed for the purpose of changing the order, while in some cases the sense is not thereby affected, in others the rhetorical effect is altered completely. It is the great advantage of Greek on this side, that while the relations indicated by syntax remain unchanged, proportion and empha-

sis may be varied almost at will by varying the order alone. Let us take passages from several authors, of differing style and content, and see what may be learned from the order there followed.

And first how does one proceed in placing before his reader a lucid definition? The following examples from Aristotle are in part quoted by Weil, but with a somewhat different explanation.<sup>1</sup> ἀρετή ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις, ὥς δοκεῖ, ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτικὴ, καὶ δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, καὶ πάντων περὶ πάντα (Rhet. I, 9). Here is a communication uncolored by emotion, aiming simply at clearness and precision. The central thing logically is the quality to be defined, ἀρετή, and this is put first. Next follows the copula, which introduces the elements of the definition, μὲν giving us warning that this statement of the essential nature of ἀρετή is to be followed up by another remark about it, and that this remark will contain a statement in some degree contrasted, according to the Greek conception, with that essential nature. Of the elements of the definition that one is placed first which denotes the general conception, δύναμις, so that we now have the statement that ἀρετή is a form of *power*; after which ὥς δοκεῖ marks parenthetically the author's cautious and tentative manner of statement. Then follow, in the strict order of their importance to the definition, the words which particularize and restrict that statement. 'ἀρετή is a power which *procures* something, namely *good things*, and also *preserves* them; it is a power which *works benefactions*, *many* and *great*, in fact *universally*.' The term analytical, applied to this order by Weil, is exactly appropriate; it is the order which in like cases a philosopher writing English would follow, so far as the language permits. Let us accompany Aristotle a little farther, not stopping now for every detail, but leaving those which may be more conveniently discussed later. μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, etc.; 'divisions of ἀρετή are δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, and the rest.' This is the statement which μὲν warned us to expect, put over against the

<sup>1</sup> O.c. pp. 65 ff.

definition of the nature of ἀρετή, and again the logically central or most important idea of the new statement is placed first. He goes on: ἀνάγκη δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική. In this last clause why is ἐστὶν put immediately after the conjunction, although he is quoting the very definition given above? εἴπερ and the connection of thought inform us. 'It must be,' he says, 'that the greatest virtues are those most useful to others, if indeed virtue really is, as was asserted, δύναμις εὐεργετική.' In its new context the copula receives a new logical importance; we indicate this by stress, or by a supporting adverb; Aristotle did the same by putting ἐστὶ first. He goes on: διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶσιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ χρήσιμος ἄλλοις. . . . ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι' ἣν τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος, ἀδικία δὲ δι' ἣν τὰ ἀλλότρια, οὐχ ὡς ὁ νόμος. Here again the position of ἐστὶ at the beginning is appropriate to its logical importance. 'People honor in the highest degree the just; δικαιοσύνη is in its essence — or, the definition of δικαιοσύνη is — the virtue whereby people have severally their own.' As before, the logical value of the elements of the definition diminishes towards the end, although here the simplest and at the same time most accurate rendering of the same definition in English follows exactly the opposite order. But of this later; meantime why does διὰ τοῦτο begin its clause? It is not an element of a definition, but it is clearly a highly important element in marking the progress of the thought. The statement τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶσιν is founded upon the preceding statement μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς χρησιμωτάτας, and therefore naturally follows it in time. διὰ τοῦτο is the element which tells us the nature of the relation subsisting between the two assertions, τοῦτο referring back to and standing for the former. The logical value of the pronoun is analogous to that of a conjunction or to that of a relative; its position is determined by like considerations. The logical importance of that which marks the connections and relations of thought must indeed generally equal or out-

weigh the logical importance of any single element of either member whose connection or relation is denoted thereby, and its natural place is ordinarily between the two members. Hence the regularity with which the copula and γίγνομαι stand between the subject and predicate, provided no other consideration comes in to disturb, either by giving these words a fuller meaning or by causing other words to assume more importance and crowd them into a later place.

Again, let us examine Aristotle's definition of tragedy. ἔστιν οὖν τραγωδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας, μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ, χωρὶς ἐκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρῶντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας (Poet. ch. 6). Here is the same kind of analysis, proceeding from the general to the particular. As before, also, the preceding context, to which we are referred by οὖν, justifies the position of ἔστιν. The progress of the discussion thus far has included tragedy, and led up to the point where the question is not so much what *tragedy* is, but rather what tragedy *is*, in view of the preceding argument. In the next chapter, taking up the discussion of the action, Aristotle says, κεῖται δ' ἡμῖν τὴν τραγωδίαν τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως εἶναι μίμησιν, quoting part of his definition with the order nearly reversed. But the reason is clear. The order is still that of logical importance, but in a new situation. μίμησις has been discussed sufficiently and is for the moment of little consequence. The point now under consideration is the *character* of the *πρᾶξις*. The same principle which before caused σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας to follow πράξεως here causes τελείας καὶ ὅλης to precede. As Aristotle disdains ornament and is concerned only with his thought, his pages are most instructive with regard to the reflection of the order of logical importance in the order of words ; but it is unnecessary to cite further.

A narrative passage taken almost at random from Thucydides will illustrate other points. 'Ο δὲ Κλέων ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς Τορώνης τότε περιέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν, ὁρμώμενος ἐκ τῆς Ἡϊόνος Σταγείρῳ μὲν προσβάλλει Ἀνδρίων ἀποικία καὶ οὐχ εἶλε, Γαληψὸν δὲ τὴν Θασίων ἀποικίαν λαμβάνει κατὰ κράτος. καὶ πέμψας ὡς Περδίκκαν πρέσβεις, ὅπως παραγέ-

νοίτο στρατιᾷ κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν, καὶ ἐς τὴν Θράκην ἄλλους παρὰ Πολλὴν τῶν Ὀδομάντων βασιλέα, ἄξοντας μισθοῦ Θράκας ὡς πλείστους, αὐτὸς ἡσύχαζε περιμένων ἐν τῇ Ἡϊόνι (V, 6, 1-2). Is not essentially the same principle of order discernible here as in the passages from Aristotle, due regard being paid to the fact that we have now to do, not with an abstract discussion, but with an account of events, occurring in a definite succession in time? The author desires to give us a clear conception of those events, with some hints at least of their causes and connections. The earlier in time is in general, for this purpose, the more important logically; with occasional exceptions for special reasons, the order of time must be a prominent factor in determining the order of representation in a medium so conditioned in time as language is. In the lines quoted Thukydides turns from the operations of one commander to those of another. The new figure whom we are to follow is Kleon, the central personage in the tale, and therefore introduced to our attention first. The time of his operations is next marked by the *ὡς* clause; for we have been told at the end of V, 3 that Kleon had stationed a garrison at Torone and set sail avowedly for Amphipolis. Within the *ὡς* clause his starting-point, Torone, is not only the beginning of his voyage in point of time, but is the best possible single word to remind us of the situation in which the preceding narrative of his doings left him, and so the best word for enabling us to take up the old thread anew. The adverb *τότε* strengthens this effect by a distinct reference to the previous passage in the form of an adverb of time. *περιέπλευσεν*, the word which describes his action, is followed by the reminder of his goal, at present the least important element in the clause, for the goal was still remote. This brings before us the logical subject, located in time, place, and circumstances. The account of his new movements begins with his departure, which is followed by the place from which he departs, his first goal and his action there. *Ἀνδρίων ἀποικίᾳ* briefly characterizes the scene of operations (all the cities in that region were well known to be colonies; the question could only be, in any case, *whose*



colony), and the statement of his failure closes that episode. The name of his second goal carries with it by implication the action of the preceding *προσβάλλει*; the new city is characterized as before, and his success is chronicled by the general assertion *λαμβάνει*, to which is added the minor detail *κατὰ κράτος*. A new cycle begins with the general statement of his new course of action in *πέμψας*; the destination of his mission is now more important than the specification of *πρέσβεις*, which is so fully implied in the phrase *πέμψας ὡς Περδίκκαν* that it might without ambiguity have been omitted; the purpose of the mission proceeds in distinct stages from the general to the particular. The elements in the account of his second embassy follow the natural scheme already marked out. Then the period closes with a return to Kleon, which required to be distinctly marked at the beginning by *αὐτός*, while the general description of *ἡσύχαζε* is followed up by the specification *περιμένων*, which is itself further particularized by naming the place. The order is perfectly transparent, precisely that which an English historian would employ in a like unemotional narrative, so far as the requirements of syntactical clearness permit. And if we turn to the journeyings and other doings of the Ten Thousand, we find Xenophon influenced by the same considerations. *έντεῦθεν ἐξελαύνει σταθμούς δύο παρασάγγας δέκα εἰς Πέλτας πόλιν οἰκουμένην. ένταῦθ' ἔμεινεν ἡμέρας τρεῖς· έν αἷς Ξενίας ὁ Ἄρκας τὰ Λύκαια ἔθυσσε καὶ ἀγῶνα ἔθηκε· τὰ δὲ ἄθλα ἦσαν σπλεγγίδες χρυσαῖ* (Anab. I, 2, 10). Kühner says:<sup>1</sup> "In der zusammenhangenden Rede tritt dasjenige Wort gern an die Spitze des Satzes, welches sich am nächsten an den Gedanken des unmittelbar vorangehenden Satzes anschliesst." To the same effect Weil remarks<sup>2</sup> upon the naturalness of beginning with that which is already known, and passing thence to the before unknown. That is to say, in unemotional discourse the known is logically the more important for the object now in view, perspicuity. In other words the resumption of what has already been stated, in a word or phrase which, while brief, indicates or hints at

<sup>1</sup> Ausführ. Gram. § 606, 9.<sup>2</sup> O.c. p. 33.

the relation of what is already known to what is still to be communicated, is one of those connecting links of thought whose logical value has been mentioned above. *ἐντεῦθεν* and *ἐνταῦθα* show the relation of what has preceded to what is still to follow, and so fully satisfy the Greek passion for *σύνδεσμος* that no *καί* or *δέ* is needed. The demonstratives and relatives furnish particularly frequent exemplifications of this principle, in English as well as in Greek; but numerous adverbs and phrases of place, time, and circumstance are to be included here. Allied to this also is that familiar device for preventing too great complication of syntax, whereby a demonstrative pronoun or adverb is placed at the end of its clause to stand for a following appositive clause which is too long to be incorporated without such warning and preparation. *ἔλεξε τάδε (τοιάδε), σκοπεῖτε ὧδί, τρόπῳ τοιῷδε*, — these and the like are common enough. The exigencies of syntax put these words at the end of their clause; but their office is the same as that of the *ἐντεῦθεν* above, and they stand in like manner between the members connected by them. Their position, though different grammatically, is logically the same. Further, in the passage from Xenophon, the position of the numerals and of the adjectives *οἰκουμένην*, *Ἀρκάς*, and *χρυσαῖ* illustrates in special forms the rule with regard to the general and the particular, in perfectly straightforward and simple discourse. It is the style which aims merely at precision, not at emphasis. An accountant to-day might upon occasion put down an item like ‘stockings, black, 3 pr. @ 50c, \$1.50.’ Doubtless it was some such feeling originally that stereotyped the formulas *ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων*, and numerous legal phrases.

Hitherto we have found, in selections fairly representative in character, that after the requirements of syntax are met, the order of words reflects the order of logical importance of the ideas for the purpose which the author has in view. In these selections there is visible a distinct tendency towards the order of English and other modern languages of the analytical type. Weil quotes<sup>1</sup> three or four sentences —

<sup>1</sup> O.c. p. 64.

their number might easily be indefinitely increased—in which the order is exactly the grammatical order of French or English, although the order of logical importance is also exactly observed. There is nothing surprising in this, for what are grammatical relations but logical relations? The reason why the subject is likely to stand first, in an uninflected tongue, is because the grammatical subject is likely to be the logical subject, and represent the leading idea in the communication. The idea of the principal verb, or of a participle, is likely to be more important than the ideas represented by their various modifiers; grammatically governing or dependent is likely to be logically leading or subordinate, general or particular. If this were not so, the English or French order would be, in the majority of cases, a most unnatural one. But as we have seen, where the situation causes divergence between the grammatical order and the logical order of ideas, the latter can in Greek, far more easily than in English, dictate the order of words without in the least obscuring syntax.

It should also be observed that the working of the syntactic principle often forms little groups—as of preposition and object; article and noun; article, adjective (or genitive), and noun; a strengthening adverb like *μάλα*, *σφόδρα* or the like, and an adjective; and others of similar nature. Then in the application of the rhetorical or logical principle, such a grammatical group must be regarded as a single word, since it contains a unity of its own, a unity which in some instances or in another language might naturally be represented by a single compound word. Again, for the term grammatical clause, as the division within which the order is governed by the rules under discussion, we must often substitute the term rhetorical group, which may not coincide exactly with the former.

But as yet nothing has been said about that species and degree of logical importance which is commonly called emphasis. If, however, the reasoning up to this point is correct, then none of the preceding statements need be changed by the introduction of a special form of logical importance. But in that case we meet a marked difference

between English and Greek, a difference which is usually overlooked and sometimes denied. While it is perfectly clear that the beginning of a clause, or of any distinct rhetorical group containing several words, is, in both languages, naturally and frequently occupied by an important idea, it is also clear that in English the end of such a member is with at least equal frequency occupied by a word which is especially important or emphatic. "The Reformation is an event long past. . . . The wide waste produced by its outbreak has been forgotten. The landmarks which were swept away have been replaced." "What shall be said of the state of things, when it is remembered that the writer is a man decried, persecuted, and proscribed; not being much valued even by his own party, and by half the nation considered as little better than an ingenious madman?" These passages from Macaulay and Burke respectively are typical; everybody who writes at all constructs his sentences in this way frequently, and orators and actors find them especially effective. Of course this arrangement is not always possible nor desirable; as was said before, we depend largely on other means of indicating emphasis, particularly on the stress and intonation of the living voice, which our written page represents but very poorly. Yet it will be found that the position in which, without distorting syntax or using any other device than simple arrangement, a weighty word is least likely to fail of receiving due attention, is in English, in the majority of cases, at the end of a group, before a pause. Now the secret of putting words where they will probably receive the due degree of attention consists in so adapting the particular sentence to the forms of intonation habitual in a language that the words, even when read rather carelessly, will fall into those places in the scheme of intonation which are suitable to the degree of emphasis desired. An elocutionist will find out the important words in any arrangement, and make them evident; but the writer must adopt that arrangement which the untrained reader will easily read aright. There is then an inclination among English-speaking people to increase the stress a little towards the end of a clause or rhetorical

group, before a pause. A person untrained in reading aloud is inclined to lay stress on the last word always, whether important or not, — a fact which plainly reveals the tendency of the language. So in reading Greek aloud, the student who does not, as he reads, fully comprehend the sense of the author, will lay stress on the last word almost invariably. The same tendency prevails in French, as is well known; it appears to be distinctly less prevalent in German, where so many clauses end with one, two, or three unemphatic auxiliaries. Possibly the tendency in English is due partly to the influence of French, which has affected the language so profoundly in other respects. But whatever the explanation, there can be no doubt of the fact. Did the same tendency, however, exist in Greek? Weil says:<sup>1</sup> “The examples of a purely descending accentuation or emphasis that we have given [that is, of emphasis stronger at the beginning and weaker at the end] fall within a circle of two or three words; nor do we believe it would be easy to find any of greater extent. A descending accentuation which should extend over a longer sentence would be disagreeable.” He proceeds to quote sentences in which the emphasis appears to be distributed between the first word and the last, and adds, “The most important places are the beginning and the end.” The edition of the *Philippics* of Demosthenes by Rehdantz, both in the earlier form and as revised by Blass, repeatedly remarks upon a similar distribution of emphasis, naming the initial position the “*pathetische Stellung*” and the final the “*signifikante Stellung*.” In the Index I under *Stellung* are collected a large number of Demosthenic illustrations of the latter, along with a much larger number of illustrations of the former. Blass also in his article on *Hermeneutik und Kritik* in Müller’s *Handbuch*,<sup>2</sup> after calling attention to the beginning of the sentence as a place of emphasis, adds, in connection with a quotation from Demosthenes, “*Auch die Endstellung, vor der Pause, ist für die Emphase geeignet, weil das am Schlusse Gehörte länger im Ohre bleibt.*” One

<sup>1</sup> O.c. p. 99.

<sup>2</sup> I p. 182.

should certainly not reject the view of such authorities, supported as it is by modern analogies, without careful examination.

In the first place there is no doubt that one can find plenty of instances that seem at first sight to justify and confirm their view. A first glance, however, does not always reveal the truth. Before leaving the question, the instances of emphasis given by the "signifikante Stellung" which are quoted in the Index of Rehdantz-Blass will be carefully scrutinized. Meanwhile, the fact that now and then an emphatic word undoubtedly stands at the end does not by any means demonstrate that that position is 'especially suitable for emphasis,' nor does modern analogy alone go far in demonstrating ancient usage. When we are inquiring not as to what is permissible, but as to what is normal, isolated examples prove nothing whatever. By such examples one could prove anything. The only sound method of ascertaining what is the normal usage is to observe what is common and what rare in large masses of the literature, without prejudging the case by transferring to Greek a preconception derived from one's mother tongue. My own doubts as to the truth of the doctrine we are considering were first raised by the practice of reading Greek aloud for pupils to translate, and by listening to the reading of pupils. And in a matter like this it is obvious that no branch of literature could furnish a better test than that which was intended for delivery before an audience. Now taking the Third Philippic of Demosthenes, by counting all the sentences, and also all those members of sentences which are sufficiently independent to be marked off in Blass's text by the colon, it was found that, while putting on the other side all cases that were even doubtful, in a large majority of cases the period is closed by a word that is clearly unemphatic and unimportant. We have seen that, as regards the words that carry the main body of thought in Greek, the requirements of syntax lay little restriction on the order. If now it be true that in Greek the final position is especially suitable for a word to which particular attention is to be directed, then it is strange

that an orator like Demosthenes, with whom well-nigh every sentence is crowded with weighty words, should, in the greatest of his public speeches, in more than half his periods put in just that position a word of little or no importance. Then if we examine the remaining minority of sentences, in which one might maintain that the principle in question is observed, we find that many cases are put out of consideration because the sentence or the clause is so short that the last word could not well stand elsewhere. Φιλίππῳ δ' ἐξέσται καὶ πράττειν καὶ ποιεῖν ὃ τι βούλεται. It is true βούλεται is emphasized; but where else could it be placed? The sentence quoted by Blass in the passage cited above from his *Hermeneutik und Kritik* is of the same character: τί τὸ κωλύον ἔτ' αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν ὅποι βούλεται; For although in this instance ὅποι βούλεται might have been placed before βαδίζειν without ambiguity, yet as it constitutes grammatically a clause by itself, it may naturally for that reason follow the word on which it depends, and the other position would have produced an objectionable hiatus. So in οὐδ' ἤτησθ' ὑμεῖς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κекίνησθε, what other position for κекίνησθε was possible? We cannot say that the emphasis is indicated by the position, where only one position is possible. The brevity of the clause has something to do with the matter, of course; but not the mere fact of a word's being placed at the end. We could certainly claim with equally good reason that in such a case the word is emphasized by its being placed at the beginning, immediately after the conjunction and an adverb which is never allowed to follow its word. In many other cases where the final word is an emphatic one, it is some other factor than position that gives the emphasis, as will be shown later. The remainder are found to yield as good or better sense when read with the presumption that the final word is not emphasized. In short, so far as this one masterpiece is concerned we are justified in saying that in itself position at the end of a clause not only lends no emphasis, but distinctly suggests the absence of emphasis. In other words, the descending emphasis, which Weil considers rare in clauses of any length, is found here to be the rule,

though indeed a rule frequently crossed by other principles. And it certainly appears natural that, as the breath available for utterance diminishes toward the end of a clause, the force of utterance, and hence the emphasis, should also diminish. With each new inspiration a renewal of the force of expression might be expected. Besides, the attention of the listener is fresher and more alert after the slight relaxation of a pause. Not to lose ourselves, however, in a search after its origin, the rule, in the enlarged form now arrived at, may be stated as follows: Within the clause or rhetorical group, after satisfying the demands of syntax, other things being equal, the logically more important or the more emphatic word precedes the less important or less emphasized; the order of words is the order of importance of the elements of the thought for the purpose in view, the larger term importance including the term of less extent, emphasis. It is clear that the term 'importance for the purpose in view' may be far from identical with the term 'prominence in the mind of the writer.' It may often be advisable for the purpose in view to veil, to put later, to prepare the way for, the very idea which one has most at heart; in estimating importance, in other words, the mind addressed must be taken into account as well as the originating mind.

Longer sentences which illustrate the rule in its simplicity, without complication from other influences, are not common; and as was just said, single examples prove nothing. But there is no difficulty in finding passages in which the descending accentuation extends over a considerable number of words. In Dem. I, 14 we find: *εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν ὡς αἰετι μείζον τῶν ὑπαρχόντων δέῃ πράττειν ἐγνωκὼς ἔσται, ὑμεῖς δ' ὡς οὐδενὸς ἀντιληπτέον ἐρρωμένως τῶν πραγμάτων, σκοπέισθ' εἰς τί ποτ' ἐλπὶς ταῦτα τελευτήσαι.* Now it should be observed that nothing is easier in such a case than to beg the question by translating nearly in the order of the original, as we are often told to do whenever possible, and then foisting upon the Greek the rhetorical character of the translation. Weil is quite right in insisting that a translation which retains the grammatical structure of the original may be wholly false to the thought. It is also



true that a translation which preserves the order at the expense of the grammatical structure may be equally false to the thought. There is no more difficult art than that of translating truly, especially where the tongues compared are so different and so highly developed as are Latin, Greek, and English. In a matter like this the problem of interpretation requires for its solution not only the most careful study of the particular situation, but also a feeling for the probabilities which can be acquired only by like study of large masses of the works of the same and of other authors. In regard to the first two clauses of the above quotation, there can be no question that when correctly interpreted they conform absolutely to the rule. The last clause one is indeed tempted to translate in such a way as to emphasize *τελευτῆσαι*. But on this it should be remarked that no one maintains that the last word is always entirely without importance; in a condensed style like that of Demosthenes, as well as in calm narrative or tranquil reflection or unimpassioned argument, in any language, the importance of the significant elements may be so evenly balanced that other considerations, or even accident, may determine the precise order. Examples are easily found. The story told by Dionysios of Halikarnassos about the tablet of Plato with its various arrangements of the opening sentence of the Republic, whether true or not, is an illustration. The tale could not have been told seriously, had men of taste felt that the other arrangements would have been inelegant, or would have much altered the general effect. And in this passage examination shows that *τί*, *ἐλπίς*, and *ταῦτα* are all important. There is logical ground for the common habit of putting the interrogative first, and here *εἰς τί* is strengthened by *ποτε*. The orator would have them consider well the question, what is the *probable* issue of their present course. Then too the syntax would furnish some ground for placing *ταῦτα τελευτῆσαι* after *ἐλπίς*. The other order would be less clear and would besides produce an excess of short syllables.

Again in IX, 8, *εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔξεστιν εἰρήνην ἄγειν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐφ' ἧμῖν ἐστι τοῦτο*, Demosthenes, with all his fondness

for condensation, repeats his idea in an entire new clause. Why? Simply because it was impossible in one clause to emphasize as he desired the two ideas of *ἔξεστι* and of *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*. He wished to lay great stress on *τῇ πόλει* as well as on the possibility. The stress which he also wished to lay on *εἰρήνην* rendered it impossible for him to place *τῇ πόλει* anywhere except at the end. But if Rehdantz and Blass are right, that brings *πόλει* into the "signifikante Stellung," into the position which is "für die Emphase geeignet." In that case the new clause, added solely for the purpose of putting the same idea, in the form *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, in the "pathetische Stellung," is decidedly otiose. No; *πόλει*, like *τοῦτο*, is by its position the least emphatic word of its clause, and the new clause was absolutely necessary to strengthen it. 'If then,' he says, 'it is possible for the state to maintain peace, and if this depends on us'—; and the true condition of affairs, contrasting so strongly with the present supposition, follows below in the words: *εἰ δ' ἕτερος τὰ ὅπλ' ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχων καὶ δύναμιν πολλὴν περὶ αὐτὸν, τοῦνομα μὲν τὸ τῆς εἰρήνης ὑμῖν προβάλλει, τοῖς δ' ἔργοις αὐτὸς τοῖς τοῦ πολέμου χρήται, τί λοιπὸν ἄλλο πλὴν ἀμύνεσθαι;* A passage from Dionysios is worth quoting here. 'What,' he says, 'if we should take this sentence of Demosthenes: *τὸ λαβεῖν οὖν τὰ διδόμενα ὁμολογῶν ἔννομον εἶναι, τὸ τούτων χάριν ἀποδοῦναι παρανόμων γράφη,*—if we should transpose the parts and deliver it in this way: *ὁμολογῶν οὖν ἔννομον. εἶναι τὸ λαβεῖν τὰ διδόμενα, παρανόμων γράφη τὸ τούτων χάριν ἀποδοῦναι.*—will it be equally *δικανικὴ καὶ στρογγύλη*? For my part I do not think so.'<sup>1</sup> Dionysios does not tell us why the new arrangement is less *δικανικὴ καὶ στρογγύλη*. We should be very grateful to him if he had raised and attempted to answer the question; but he assumes that the reader will feel the difference, and says virtually: You see what the master of style does; use your taste and judgment in imitating him. But we must attempt the analysis which he omitted. What are the changes introduced by the second version? Briefly, the

<sup>1</sup> *περὶ συνθέσεως*, 7. (Quotation from Dem. XVIII, 119.)

grammatical relations have been allowed more weight in determining the order, which now is almost that of English. *ὁμολογῶν* and *παρὰνόντων γράφη*, which are highly emphatic antithetical ideas, are placed first; the two nouns *τὸ λαβεῖν τὰ διδόμενα* and *τὸ τούτων χάριν ἀποδοῦναι* are also made prominent by their antithesis, and according to Weil, Rhodant, and Blass, are in exactly the right place to give them special importance. The syntax in this form is much clearer. It is an order which Lysias might very probably have employed. Why then did Demosthenes adopt the other? Simply because he wished to give *τὸ λαβεῖν τὰ διδόμενα* and *τὸ τούτων χάριν ἀποδοῦναι* more emphasis than could naturally fall to them in the so-called "signifikante Stellung." The antithesis of idea was not sufficient for his purpose. He therefore put them first in their respective members, thus adding to the force which lay in the natural contrast all the force which could be added by the most emphatic possible position. Even at the expense of syntactical clearness this order is adopted, because in no other way, in the same space, could equal force be given. Nor can one maintain that the additional emphasis is due merely to the fact that the infinitives are removed from what our language treats as the normal position. The arrangement of grammatical elements here exemplified is far too common in Greek to permit us to attribute the additional emphasis to the mere grammatical arrangement. Nor can diminution of syntactical clearness in itself increase emphasis, but rather diminishes it. It is their position as first, not their position as grammatically unusual, which is so forcible; for their position is not in Greek grammatically unusual, but simply a trifle less usual. In the same degree in which the passage illustrates the force of the "pathetische Stellung," it condemns the idea that the final position is a "signifikante Stellung."

As an illustration from the style of simple but animated conversation, let us take a passage from Plato's *Protagoras*. Hippokrates, in his eagerness to tell the important news, has awakened Sokrates before dawn, and the latter, recognizing the voice in the darkness, says, *Ἱπποκράτης οὗτος · μή τι*

νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις; Οὐδέν γ', ἡ δ' ὅς, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθὰ γε. Εὖ ἂν λέγοις, replies Sokrates, ἔστι δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ ἔνεκα τηρικᾷδε ἀφίκου; Πρωταγόρας, ἔφη, ἤκει, στὰς παρ' ἐμοί. Πρῶην, ἔφην ἐγώ· σὺ δὲ ἄρτι πέπυσαι; Then Hippokrates explains why he heard it only the evening before, when, on his return from pursuit of the runaway slave, his brother said to him, ἤκει Πρωταγόρας, — the same phrase which the young man had just used to Sokrates, but in reverse order. We cannot suppose that the change is accidental. It would be absurd not to interpret the order in the same way in both instances, and this interpretation agrees with the situation perfectly. 'Protagoras *has come*' suggests that Hippokrates and his brother were expecting the sophist; his *arrival* was the point to be announced, rather than the name of the personage. But when Hippokrates went to his friend, the great thing in his mind was the *man*, for whose instruction the ingenuous youth was longing. The natural announcement now was, 'Protagoras *has come*.' The clause σὺ δὲ ἄρτι πέπυσαι is another case where the translation that seems at first the most simple and natural is misleading. 'Have *you* only just *heard* of it?' is an everyday expression, and does well enough; but if one infers from it that the Greek emphasized πέπυσαι, the inference is unwarranted. The contrast is clearly between πρῶην and ἄρτι. The English habit of ascending accentuation has brought an emphasis upon 'heard' which is not quite logical. The delightful humor and vivacity of so much of Plato's conversations are rendered unmistakable by the particles and by the delicate gradations of order, which express, even on the printed page, those intonations that in English can be given by the living voice alone. It would be instructive, did space permit, to take a page or two at random and note the arrangement of every sentence.

Of level stress, perhaps the most unmistakable examples are series of words in the same construction connected by repeated καί, ἤ, οὐτε, or other coördinating conjunction. Yet even in such a simple series we sometimes find a descent in the emphasis. In Lysias VII, 37 the speaker has been arguing his innocence from the fact that he had offered his slaves

for torture, which offer the accuser had declined, — a familiar situation. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν, he says, εἰς τοῦτο προθυμίας ἀφικόμην, ἡγούμενος μετ' ἐμοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βασάνου καὶ ἐκ μαρτύρων καὶ ἐκ τεκμηρίων ὑμᾶς περὶ τοῦ πράγματος τᾷληθῇ πυθέσθαι. To get the same effect in English without changing the order we must change the connectives. The sense is, 'deeming it in my interest that you should learn the truth about the matter from torture, as well as from witnesses and arguments.' The emphasis descends from βασάνων to the end, and we naturally translate the unemphatic ὑμᾶς . . . πυθέσθαι before ἐκ βασάνων to bring the emphasis right in English. Another familiar and unmistakable example is the line of Sophokles (Ant. 281): μὴ φευρεθῆς ἄνους τε καὶ γέρων ἅμα. The student who does not in translating reverse the order of ἄνους τε καὶ γέρων misses the point of Kreon's harsh remark. But it was said above (p. 12) that the order may sometimes be chosen for the express purpose of distributing the emphasis, in order to produce a special effect, comical or solemn or simply dignified. As one may keep an unmoved countenance while sending his listeners into fits of laughter, so in verbal order one may adopt the style of unruffled dignity to enhance the contrast between manner and matter. One may put in a modest position the very word which contains the pith of a witticism, in order to make the stroke more subtle and its effect more lasting. Sometimes we find also that peculiarly dignified and weighty movement, resulting from an order that leaves in suspense the relation between several ideas, themselves of about equal importance, until at the very end a verb adds, as it were, the keystone of the arch. To what circumstances could such a style be better suited than to those of the funeral oration of Perikles, where the situation and the character of both speaker and reporter favor it? The historian makes the orator felicitate the Athenians on their numerous festal games and sacrifices and on their tasteful homes, ὦν καθ' ἡμέραν ἡ τέρψις τὸ λυπηρὸν ἐκπλήσσει (Thuk. II, 38, 1). And in the very next chapter stands the patriotic boast: τὴν τῶν πέλας αὐτοὶ ἐπελθόντες οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐν τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ τοὺς περὶ τῶν οἰκείων ἀμυνομένους μαχόμενοι

τὰ πλείω κρατοῦμεν. This is the style of which the Roman writers were so fond, and is appropriate to the imperious Roman character. So might one speak who is proudly conscious that every word is laden with meaning and will be weighed. Each item of the thought stands forth, so to speak, separately, and demands that it be held firmly in mind until the final word completes the circle. A certain unity is thereby attained, which is at times very effective in any language, but which the Greek did not often aim to produce on any large scale, though single participial and infinitive clauses are frequently thus constructed.

But it must be remembered that order is not the only means of indicating logical or rhetorical importance, and Greek is far too rich in resources to be restricted to the forms thus far described, numerous as those are. When for any reason it is desired to place an important word later in the clause, there are many ways of giving it the due degree and shade of importance. For example, ἐγώ, σύ, and αὐτός in the nominative or in adjectival agreement with another word, are always emphatic. Often Demosthenes, after putting the verb early, and perhaps following that up with other words only a trifle less important, then puts the pronoun at the end, to emphasize both subject and predicate,—as in I, 9, *ἠύξήσαμεν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Φίλιππον ἡμεῖς*. One cannot claim that a word which would be emphatic anywhere is rendered emphatic primarily by standing last. He would doubtless have placed *ἡμεῖς* first had he not desired to give still more emphasis to *ἠύξήσαμεν*. Numerous adverbs too, and particles like οὐδέ, καί, γε, μήν, δέ, περ, furnish alone a pretty extensive apparatus for marking shades of expression. Then there are various ways of delaying attention upon an idea which it is desired to make prominent. Simple repetition is a common and obvious means of doing this. It is a well-known mannerism of Demosthenes to employ two synonyms instead of a single word, for this object alone. Rehdantz-Blass in Index I to their edition of the Philippics give under the heading *Erweiterung* an excellent summary of contrivances of this sort, with numerous examples; for Demosthenes

uses them all. Another device is described by Weil. Words which are not emphatic, but which are usually necessary to the grammatical construction, and therefore possess considerable logical importance, are placed by preference immediately after words on which emphasis is to be thrown. The particle *ἄν* is the most familiar example of this; but alongside of *ἄν* may be placed in this regard all forms of the copula *εἰμί*, the participle *ἔχων* in some of its uses, the interjected *ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι* or *δικασταί*, parenthetical expressions like *ἔφη* or *ἦ δ' ὅς* or *οἶμαι*, proper names which are already known, but must be inserted to avoid ambiguity — all words and phrases which, although they cannot be omitted, the voice and the attention can pass over lightly. Such words leave the mind free in a measure to retain and dwell a little longer upon the important idea which has preceded. They cannot in themselves add much to the emphasis; they modestly give their neighbors a little more time to deepen their impression. Sometimes indeed such unemphatic words and expressions, particularly verbs, virtually divide the clause into shorter rhetorical members. Again, the wide separation of two words which would ordinarily belong together may sometimes have the effect of causing the attention to dwell longer on the former, whose sense is suspended in uncertainty until its complement comes. Occasionally too the separated ideas are of such character that the former rouses the expectation and directs attention to the latter, which is awaited, and therefore makes a stronger impression when it arrives. In this way it may occur that the last word of a clause is rendered rather emphatic. In the Protagoras, *e.g.*, Hippokrates exclaims (310 e, f.) *ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ' αὐτόν, ἵνα ἔνδον καταλάβωμεν; καταλύει δ', ὥς ἐγὼ ἤκουσα, παρὰ Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἰππονίκου· ἀλλ' ἴωμεν.* *καταλύει* is made prominent by standing first and by being followed by the parenthetical phrase; but the situation is such that we also wish to know *where* Protagoras is staying. The attention is awakened and directed towards the name, which thus occupies the thought longer. The postponed word may be the grammatical subject of the sentence, as *where*, earlier in the same dialogue,

Sokrates says (309 d), *σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας*. His friend is waiting eagerly for the name, which Sokrates intentionally keeps back as long as he can. It is such instances, by no means rare, that have given rise to the idea that the reversal of what is assumed to be the natural order of subject and predicate necessarily gives emphasis to the subject. It will be found that this result follows only when, as in the instance just quoted, there is something in the situation which distinctly directs the interest towards the postponed word. There is no emphasis on the subject in the sentence, *οὐκ ἂν ἠνώχλει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ Φίλιππος* (Dem. III, 5), because Philip has been all the while in their thoughts; the name is inserted merely to make quite clear that no other of the neighboring nouns is to be supplied as the subject. The list of like examples might be indefinitely extended, and what appeared to be a flat contradiction of one of the fundamental principles of order is found to be merely an occasional and easily explained exception. Allied to this is another apparent exception (for it proves to be only apparent), which is abundantly illustrated by Demosthenes. After the construction and sense are apparently complete, a new idea, or a new modification of a previous idea, which from the grammatical point of view alone would naturally take an earlier place, is added as if it were an afterthought, being separated from the preceding words by a slight, perhaps almost inappreciable, pause. Clough's Dipsychus says,

'Tis gone, the fierce inordinate desire,  
The burning thirst for action — utterly.

The whole sentence, nearly, is built up in this way, so that each division after the words 'Tis gone' stands out independently and with a certain degree of emphasis. The effect of the arrangement is that each added element calls up in the mind the repetition of the entire preceding clause, and so virtually constitutes a clause by itself, epitomizing the preceding clause and adding a single new idea. Demosthenes is particularly fond of using adverbs in this way, most



frequently *εἰκότως* and *δικαίως*, often with a justifying clause following; but other adverbs and other parts of speech are treated in the same way by all authors. Let us look at a few illustrations. *καὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τις ἂν, ὃ ἄ. 'Α., δίκαιος λογιστὴς τῶν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἡμῖν ὑπηργμένων καταστάς, καί-περ οὐκ ἐχόντων ὡς δεῖ πολλῶν, ὅμως μεγάλην ἂν ἔχειν αὐτοῖς χάριν εἰκότως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πόλλ' ἀπολωλεκέναι κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀμελείας ἂν τις θεῖη δικαίως, τὸ δὲ κτλ.* (Dem. I, 10). So Blass punctuates; but it would be more natural to put the colon after *χάριν* and a comma after *εἰκότως*. For it is but a step from the construction of *εἰκότως* here to that of *καλῶς* in the speech On the Crown 314: *εἶτα τῶν πρότερον γεγεννημένων ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν μέμνησαι. καὶ καλῶς ποιεῖς*. No one would in reading connect *εἰκότως* with *χάριν*, as one would connect *δικαίως* with *θεῖη*. *εἰκότως* makes a clause by itself, highly emphatic of course, while *δικαίως* in this instance does not. In his condensed style, which forces him to employ every means available, consistently with brevity, for emphasizing words in all positions, Demosthenes makes great use of this particular device. Thus it became something of a habit with him to place adverbs last; and it is sometimes a nice question to decide whether a word so placed is really to be isolated by a pause, or is put last because of its trifling importance or from habit, and was spoken without separation. In the sentence *ἠὺξήσαμεν, ὃ ἄ. 'Α., Φίλιππον ἡμεῖς*, quoted above, something may have been added to the natural force of the pronoun by the fact that the sentence was complete without it. A pause may or may not have been made after *Φίλιππον* according to the degree of independence intended to be given to *ἡμεῖς*. The same ambiguity and the same possibility of graduating the emphasis appears in the English sentence, 'We have exalted Philip ourselves'; but we cannot insert the vocative phrase after 'exalted,' and if we put it after 'Philip,' then 'ourselves' is compelled to take the position which *ἡμεῖς* was perhaps intended to take. In Lysias X, 1 the speaker, justifying himself for bringing suit against Theomnestos for slander, says, *ἐν ἐκείνῳ γὰρ τῷ ἀγῶνι τὸν πατέρα μ' ἔφασκεν ἀπεκτονέαι*

τὸν ἑαυτοῦ. Of course the use of ἑαυτοῦ instead of the simple μου gives a certain degree of emphasis, but this is enhanced by the fact that the sentence was apparently complete, so that this phrase has the air of an afterthought. And the gibe in the next sentence explains why the addition was made: ἐγὼ δ', εἰ μὲν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ με ἀπεκτονέειν ᾗτιᾱτο, συγγνώμην ἂν εἶχον αὐτῷ τῶν εἰρημένων, φαῦλον γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον ἡγοῦμην. Somewhat less marked applications of the principle are very common, as in these examples from Isocrates XV: ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν χάριν κομίσασθαι παρ' ὑμῶν τὴν μεγίστην (60); οὕτω πρῶως διώκει καὶ νομίμως (125); ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἔτι δέονται λόγων καὶ παντοδαπῶν (196); πολὺ γὰρ καλλίω δόξαν ἐκείνων κτώμενοι τῇ πόλει τυγχάνουσι καὶ μάλλον ἀρμόττουσαν (302). The weakest, but still discernible, form is seen in the practice of placing an attributive with the repeated article after a substantive, as ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγῶσι τοῖς ἐνθάδε γιγνομένοις. In all these forms alike we find that such emphasis as is given by the position is really given, not because a word stands last in its clause, but because in a new rhetorical group the word in question stands first. In fact the degree of emphasis depends chiefly on the degree of separation between the new rhetorical group and the preceding one, — in other words, upon the degree of clearness with which the position is marked as first of a group. Here, then, our rule meets with no real exception.

Another principle which finds a wide application may be stated thus. Any sort of parallelism of idea, whether it is or is not reflected in a parallelism of form, — as by paronomasia, by μέν . . . δέ, by καί . . . καί or οὔτε . . . οὔτε, by οὐκ . . . ἀλλά, by ὁμοιοτέλευτα, by synonyms or antonyms, or by any one of the numerous devices of this nature, — calls attention to the words thus made parallel or antithetical to each other. Any page of pronounced epideiktic character furnishes plenty of illustrations of this, and a single passage taken almost at random from Isokrates will suffice. πλείστων μὲν οὖν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους καὶ μεγίστων ἐπαίνων ἀξίους ἡγοῦμαι γεγενῆσθαι τοὺς τοῖς σώμασιν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος προκινδυνεύσαντας· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου τούτου γενομένων καὶ δυναστευ-

σάντων ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ τοῖν πολέοιν δίκαιον ἀμνημονεῖν· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ προασκήσαντες τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους καὶ τὰ πλήθη προτρέψαντες ἐπ' ἀρετὴν καὶ χαλεποὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς τοῖς βαρβάροις ποιήσαντες. οὐ γὰρ ὀλιγώρουν τῶν κοινῶν οὐδ' ἀπέλανον μὲν ὡς ἰδίῳν ἡμέλουν δ' ὡς ἀλλοτρίων, ἀλλ' ἐκήδοντο μὲν ὡς οἰκείων ἀπείχοντο δ' ὥσπερ χρὴ τῶν μηδὲν προσηκόντων. And so on (IV, 75 f.), with all varieties of parallelism. Although an important word frequently ends its clause, yet in all such cases it will be found that the earlier positions are already occupied by words of equal, or more commonly greater importance, and in every instance it is clear that it is not position but something else that indicates the importance of the final word, and that this other something is equally effective when the parallel words stand elsewhere than at the end. It should be noted, however, that the adoption of a rhetorical figure may itself considerably affect the order. If, for example, two words are used which make paronomasia appropriate, that may furnish reason for placing them side by side; *ὁμοιοτέλευτα* strike the ear more strongly if they occur in similar positions in the clause, whether at the end or at the beginning.

It will now be necessary to examine, in the light of results already won, those passages in which Weil and Rehdantz-Blass find exemplified the force of the "signifikante Stellung," or of emphasis given by final position. For if these were left without discussion, they and others like them might be regarded as still standing against the rule herein set forth. The discussion shall be made as brief as possible. First be it observed that a wrong impression may be received when a sentence is taken out of its context. Of the following sentence from Dem. VIII, 50 Weil quotes<sup>1</sup> a part only, namely the words that are spaced. εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦτο δοκεῖ, τοῦναντίον τε πρόϊσμεν ἅπαντες ὅτι ὅσῳ ἂν πλεόνων ἐάσωμεν ἐκεῖνον γενέσθαι κύριον, τοσοῦτῳ χαλεπωτέρῳ καὶ ἰσχυροτέρῳ χρησόμεθ' ἐχθρῷ, ποῖ ἀναδυόμεθα; On this he remarks that "the emphatic positions are occu-

<sup>1</sup> O.c. p. 107.

pied by κύριον and ἐχθρῶ." But is it so? Again we must beware of begging the question by a translation. The mere completion of the sentence deprives them of part of the force which they seemed to have without the subordinating clauses. But further, what is the course of the argument here? The subject of the entire speech is Philip's encroachments, now many years continued, which long ago proved him the irreconcilable enemy of Athens and of all Greeks still independent. It is no longer a question of his being master of a wide extent of Greek territory, or of his being an enemy; that he is both these has been abundantly pointed out in the preceding sections. 'If we all know beforehand,' he says, 'that the more the number of his subjects increases, the *stronger and more dangerous* enemy we shall find him, then how long is our shrinking inaction to continue?' While not wholly unimportant, κύριον and ἐχθρῶ are the least important words in their clauses. The position of γενέσθαι and χρησόμεθα with respect to them suggests another point worth noting. Languages may differ in some details with regard to the degree of importance assigned to the individual elements of a thought. A Londoner, a Scotchman, and an Irishman — of equal intelligence and education, but not free from the influence of the local dialect — would probably, in reading the same page, differ slightly in their distribution of the degree of emphasis, as well as in the other elements of pronunciation. It was remarked above that our habit of increasing emphasis at the end not infrequently lays stress upon a word which does not logically deserve it. In Greek the verb is more likely to be relatively important than in English. Some reasons for this are patent. If we wish to emphasize the tense or the mode, we often do so by stress upon an auxiliary; but as these are in Greek combined with the fundamental notion of the verb in a single word, that one form must receive the stress in each case of that nature. Then, too, the Greek verb-form is long enough to bear heavy stress without abruptness, while we must often support a short but emphatic verb by some adverb. He has *done* it; he *has* done it; he has really done it, — all these would be

expressed by the one form *πεποίηκε*, made prominent by position or some other means. In many cases the prominent position of a verb, though at first sight surprising, is seen at once to be natural and significant when we take account of this fact. For instance, Isokrates says (XV, 197 f.): *λέγουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν, ὥς ἔστιν ἡ περὶ τοὺς σοφιστὰς διατριβὴ φλυαρία καὶ φενακισμός· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἡύρηται παιδεία τοιαύτη, δι' ἧς γένοιτό τις ἂν ἢ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δεινότερος ἢ περὶ τὰς πράξεις φρονιμώτερος, ἀλλ' οἱ προέχοντες ἐν τούτοις τῇ φύσει τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσιν· οἱ δὲ δεινότερους μὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι τοὺς περὶ τὴν μελέτην ταύτην ὄντας, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ διαφθείρεσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι χείρους· ἐπειδὴν γὰρ λάβουσι δύναμιν, τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιβουλεύειν.* The position of the verbs is necessary for the emphasis intended; their force may be suggested thus: 'They assert, some of them, that study with the sophists is, as a matter of fact, nonsense and humbug; for no method of education has even been discovered, whereby one could really be *made* either more skilled in the use of language or more intelligent in action, but those who do excel in these particulars excel by nature. Others admit that those who study in this way are indeed more skilful, but at the same time they say that a process of corruption of character is all the while going on; for when they have once *acquired* ability, they use it against the property of others.'

The following passage is cited by Weil<sup>1</sup> as an instance of "harsh emphasis" at the close. *οὐ δὲ θαυμαστόν, εἰ στρατεύόμενος καὶ πονῶν ἐκεῖνος καὶ παρὼν ἐφ' ἅπασι καὶ μήτε καιρὸν μήθ' ὄραν παραλείπων, ἡμῶν μελλόντων καὶ ψηφίζομένων καὶ πυνθανομένων περιγίγνεται* (Dem. II, 23). But the context shows that *περιγίγνεται* is really of little importance, being merely a repetition of an idea just before expressed. The orator wishes to lead his audience to attribute Philip's remarkable success, of which he has been speaking, to its true cause. He has just said, '*We* sit still and do nothing; *he* does not even trust his friends, to say nothing of the gods, to act in his behalf, but does everything himself. It is

<sup>1</sup> O.c. p. 97.

no wonder,' he continues, 'that he gets the better of us in *these* circumstances.'

The examples of "signifikante Stellung" quoted by Rehdantz-Blass may all be disposed of in one of two ways. Either the emphasis is accounted for by some principle already explained, or the supposed emphasis is found on examination not to exist. Under the former head fall most of the instances of a final adverb; e.g. εἵπερ ποτὲ καὶ νῦν. νῦν here stands plainly for a whole clause, and is further strengthened by καί. On Dem. IV, 8, κατέπτηχε μέντοι πάντα νῦν, οὐκ ἔχοντ' ἀποστροφὴν διὰ τὴν ὑμετέραν βραδυτήτα καὶ ῥάθυμίαν, ἣν ἀποθέσθαι φημὶ δεῖν ἤδη, the note of Rehdantz recognizes this very principle. While calling the final position an sich bedeutend, he speaks of it also as *überdies durch eine kurze Pause hervorgehoben*, so that the adverb receives thereby *fast die Kraft eines selbständigen Gedankens*. A consistent application of this truth can lead only to the doctrine defended above (p. 35 f.). In the following case I can find no emphasis on the adverb. ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου καὶ ὧν ἐκείνος πράττει νῦν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσι (IX, 31). What reason is there for supposing that Demosthenes meant νῦν to be especially prominent? Do we not give his whole meaning when we say, 'what *he* is now doing,' without any stress on now? So in τί οὖν ἄν τις εἴποι ταῦτα λέγεις ἡμῖν νῦν; (I, 14). If νῦν has any emphasis, it is surely slight in comparison with that on λέγεις and ταῦτα. Next let us turn to some instances where a subject, it is maintained, is emphasized by position at the end. ἄξιον δ' ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ λογίσασθαι τὰ πράγματ' ἐν ᾧ καθέστηκεν νυνὶ τὰ Φιλίππου (I, 21). The emphasis on τὰ Φιλίππου is sufficiently accounted for by the fact that the words contain a new specification added in the manner of an afterthought after the sentence is grammatically complete. πολλὰ μὲν τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀδίκως εἰληφώς, ὑπὲρ ὧν ψηφίσμαθ' ὑμέτερόν ἐγκαλοῦντα κύρια ταυτί (VIII, 6). The demonstrative -ί and the isolating pause here combine their force. ἀλλ' ἴσασιν ἀκριβῶς, εἰ καὶ πάνν φησί τις αὐτοὺς ἀναισθητοὺς εἶναι, ὅτι εἰ γενήσεται πόλεμος πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοῖς, τὰ μὲν κακὰ πάνθ' ἔξουσιν αὐτοί, τοῖς δ' ἀγαθοῖς ἐφεδρεῦν

ἕτερος καθεδεῖται (V, 15). The note here is, "Die markirte Endstellung von αὐτοὶ ist durch die gleiche des vorangehenden αὐτοῖς hervorgerufen, und durch den in der Wiederholung liegenden Nachdruck noch gesteigert." But does not this overlook the fact that αὐτοῖς is merely the personal pronoun, to which no emphasis can here be assigned, — beyond the very attenuated emphasis due to the slight contrast between it and ὑμᾶς, — while αὐτοί, in the nominative, is always the emphasizing pronoun? They are virtually two different words. Although they chance to refer to the same party, αὐτοί is not to be regarded as a repetition of αὐτοῖς, but is inserted to point the strong contrast between the subject of ἔξουσι and the subject of καθεδεῖται, ἕτερος. The sense is, 'if war actually arises between them and you, they will themselves have all the trouble, while Philip will get all the advantage.' ἔν μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε πρῶτον ὑπάρχειν φημι δεῖν · ὅπως εἴτε συμμάχους εἴτε σύνταξιν εἴτ' ἄλλο τι βούλεται τις κατασκευάζειν τῇ πόλει, τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν εἰρήνην μὴ λύων τοῦτο ποιήσει, οὐχ ὥς θαυμαστὴν οὐδ' ὥς ἀξίαν οὖσαν ὑμῶν · ἀλλ' ὅποια τίς ποτ' ἐστὶν αὕτη, μὴ γενέσθαι μᾶλλον εἶχε τοῖς πράγμασι καιρόν, ἢ γεγενημένη νῦν δι' ἡμᾶς λυθῆναι · πολλὰ γὰρ προείμεθα, ὧν ὑπαρχόντων τότε ἂν ἡ νῦν ἀσφαλέστερος καὶ ῥάων ἦν ἡμῖν ὁ πόλεμος (V, 13). The note on this last clause contains the statement, "Der Redner drängt den gewichtigsten Begriff πόλεμος an das Ende, welcher wie ein immer neu sich entladender Donnerschlag durch die Beweisführung rollt und die Rede schliesst." Repeated and careful examination of the passage and the context leaves me still unable to adopt this view, or to regard it otherwise than as involving a distinct misapprehension of the situation. The orator is not urging to war, but the very opposite. In the words of the Einleitung of this very edition by Rehdantz-Blass, 'Because Demosthenes recognized the fearful danger of a war, . . . he came forward and spoke against the prevailing sentiment of the people.' After an extraordinarily long introduction, to prepare his audience for his unpalatable advice, he now comes to his difficult task. 'Above all things,' he says, 'do not openly break the present peace; not because

it is advantageous or worthy of you; but such as it is, being in existence, it must not *now* be abrogated by *you*. The peace ought indeed never to have been made; *then*, when we *had* the advantages which we have thrown away, *then*, rather than now, the war which this peace prematurely closed was both safe and easy for us.' This interpretation of the order, so far as πόλεμος and its relations are concerned, is the only one appropriate to the circumstances.

Two instances of "andere betonte Begriffe" at the end of their clauses will close our list. *περὶ τούτων δ' οἶομαι τὴν ταχίστην συμφέρειν καὶ βεβουλεύσθαι καὶ παρεσκευάσθαι, καὶ μὴ τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἄλλων θορύβοις καὶ ταῖς κατηγορίαις ἀπὸ τούτων ἀποδρᾶναι* (VIII, 3). The strong antithesis between the positive and negative expression of the idea leaves here no occasion to search for any other explanation of such emphasis as falls upon ἀποδρᾶναι. ὅπερ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ βελτίστου λέγουσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ἔνεστιν ἐνίοτε πρὸς χάριν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν· τὰ γὰρ πράγματ' ἀνάγκη σκοπεῖν ὅπως σωθήσεται (IX, 63). It is true that σωθήσεται is highly emphatic; but if a clause consists of a conjunction and a single word besides, where else can that word be placed save last and first at once? τὰ πράγματα is brought forward and made the object of σκοπεῖν to give it the prominence due: 'for we must consider *the public interests*.' When this has been done, ὅπως σωθήσεται completes the thought, and by its very brevity brings out the patriotic motive with all possible force.

But we need not pursue this examination farther. A careful scrutiny of every example cited by Weil or by Rehdantz-Blass for the force of the final position fails to discover anything contradictory to the doctrines here maintained. Every sentence must have some word at the end. We have found that only when some other condition is present, besides the mere fact of closing the sentence, is the final word emphasized above the remainder of the sentence. Is it then logical to say that it is the position as final which gives, or which points out, the emphasis? No, it is in each case that other condition, the presence of which is always accompanied



by emphasis ; not the position, which in the majority of cases is not accompanied by emphasis.

*Third, euphonic.* — But we have hitherto left out of account a third consideration which affects the order of words, namely, euphony, or agreeableness of sound, in the widest sense. We are conscious of this motive in arranging words in our mother tongue, and we know that the Greeks paid great attention to it even in prose. As to verse, even if we are not ready to admit that every variety of meter is itself due directly to the desire for the agreeable in sound, yet certainly the desire to maintain the meter — that is, a certain definite form of the agreeable in sound — exercised a potent influence on the order in which the poet should arrange his material. It is for this reason that examples in meter have been avoided in this paper, because of the disproportionately large influence in them of an element not easily calculable. For in our endeavor to appreciate euphony in Greek we meet peculiar difficulties. As the ancient pronunciation has perished, it is impossible for us to know exactly how the language sounded from the lips of a Greek, and still more impossible for us to acquire his ear for euphony, while we know very well that his notion of euphony differed in many particulars from our own. The difficulty is greatest in prose. For the euphony now referred to is not merely a matter of the pronunciation of individual letters and the mode of their combination with immediate neighbors. With regard to this our knowledge, though defective, would perhaps suffice to prevent us from going very far wrong, if we made the matter a subject of special study. A pronunciation which would be far from satisfying a native ear might still do very well for our purpose. But the euphony which affects order depends far more upon the flow of larger combinations, that is, upon the rhythm. Now in poetry, perhaps with the exception of meters in quintuple time, we can acquire a fair notion of the rhythm ; for our own verse and music furnish close analogies, — we are not entirely alien in race, — and it is possible for us to learn to read Greek verse quantitatively. Our pronunciation of English would have sounded outlandish to Shakspeare ;

yet in the main we probably appreciate the euphony of his verse as well as his contemporaries, because, though individual sounds have changed, the rhythm remains essentially the same. We need not be very much worse off with regard to most Greek verse, provided we are trained to read it in proper time. From the statements of native scholars, lighted up by modern analogies, the rhythm of poetry can be reproduced in the main with certainty. But for the rhythm of prose we have no safe guide. For in prose, as in verse, the location of the ictus was determined by the relative quantities of the successive syllables, while in our prose and verse alike the relative quantities are determined by the location of the ictus, which is fixed by our word-accent. The great difference between the rhythm of poetry and of prose lies in the regularity, in the simplicity of law, observed by the former, as compared with the irregular and shifting character, the complexity of law, observed by the latter; and the ancients have left us no key to this complexity sufficient to enable us to follow the movement of their prose with certainty. It is true that Dionysios analyzes passages from Thukydides and Demosthenes, dividing them into feet for us, and discusses at some length the effects produced by the employment of different kinds of feet. Aristotle also in his *Rhetoric* has a few words on the subject, and scattered remarks of other authors add a little. But Dionysios does not tell us on what principles he divides a given series of syllables into these particular feet instead of those others, which appear to us equally possible. In short, we have no means of determining where a Greek would have placed the ictuses in a given page of prose, and therefore no means of detecting the rhythm. Avoidance of hiatus, avoidance of a succession of short syllables, the preference for certain quantitative combinations, — these and a few other external characteristics we can detect mechanically; but we cannot acquire the native feeling about even these, much less about those details which no grammarian ever reduced to formal statement. No doubt also the rhythm, as in English, sometimes affected the emphasis, so that a word in a given place with reference to other

words might receive a different emphasis according to its place and its character with reference to the rhythm. Here then would be another element which we cannot measure with exactness.

Yet it is not likely that in prose euphonic considerations were ordinarily allowed very great weight in this direction. In a passage where the logical relations were of much consequence an unpleasing rhythm was probably avoided by the choice of words rather than by any considerable change of order. The claims of syntax must be met first, in any style, if one is to be understood at all; the desire for clearness and force of expression beyond those requirements, or for some particular rhetorical effect, and finally the desire for a pleasant flow of sound, including an agreeable and appropriate rhythm, are active in differing proportions according to the style of composition, the circumstances, the nature of the persons addressed, the artistic endowment of the author. Of course, as was said above, we must allow for cases where, within limits, the order is indifferent. Where the precise order is of little consequence, the desire for variety, which should be classed in our third group, can easily be traced. Dionysios makes a good deal of this under the head of *μεταβολή*.<sup>1</sup> Then, too, the mingling of these various influences made certain forms recur often, so as to produce what we may call fashions of order, which would frequently be adopted unconsciously. In the great freedom which Greek so long maintained, these fashions of order are not numerous, yet some can be detected. For example, an emphatic adjective is often separated from its less important noun by a verb, so that we find many clauses ending in adjective, verb, noun, — as in these phrases from Antiphon V: *ἀνωμότοις πιστεύσαντας τοῖς μαρτυροῦσι*. — *οὗ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶργεσθαι προαγορεύουσι τοῖς τοῦ φόνου φεύγουσι τὰς δίκας*. — *τῷ αὐτῷ χρώνται νόμῳ τούτῳ*. This is one of the forms whose frequent recurrence gives the impression of an inclination to place a moderately emphatic word in the last place but one. Another fashion of

<sup>1</sup> O.c. 19.

order originated in such phrases as ἀνώματος μὲν αὐτὸς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς, ἀνώμοτοι δὲ οἱ μάρτυρες καταμαρτυροῦσι (Antiphon V, 12), where the importance of the idea justifies the repetition and place of ἀνώματος, ἀνώμοτοι. But it can be counted as nothing more than fashion when Xenophon writes τριακοσίους μὲν ὀπλίτας τριακοσίους δὲ πελταστὰς ἔχων παρεγένετο (Anab. I, 2, 3); or when Plutarch writes βάλλει μὲν αὐτὸς ἀκοντίῳ, βάλλουσι δὲ οἱ περὶ αὐτόν (Artax. 10). In the latter cases the contrast is really between the other ideas of the phrase, and neither τριακοσίους nor βάλλει has sufficient importance to justify its prominence. Other instances of stereotyped formulas are seen in the rule of precedence observed by the personal pronouns, and in the parenthetical position of ἔφη introducing a direct quotation.

But speaking generally, in every sentence the order is the resultant of the forces described in the above groups. The resultant varies with the variation of any element. The play of these forces gives rise to the infinite variety which is so striking a feature of Greek order. The individuality of an author is as plainly legible in his order as in his diction, and the master continually charms and surprises by the unhackneyed and the unexpected in order no less than in thought; for the matter cannot after all be reduced to a rule of thumb, which the apprentice or the journeyman can apply. Artistic form is something infinitely above that. Yet an understanding of these general principles increases greatly our insight into both form and matter, and is indispensable to interpretation. The wide gap between the style of Aristotle and Pindar as regards order is evident, and all the gradations between are significant and deserving of attention. It would be interesting to trace the differences between prose and poetry in general, and the relation of order to different forms of verse, which by its very structure, divided into shorter rhythmical members with numerous correspondences, presents greater facilities than prose for the expression of emotion by position. But this topic is too large for discussion here.